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In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit
By MIKE BURKART AND TORE ELLINGSEN*
It is typically less profitable for an opportunistic borrower to divert inputs than to
divert cash. Therefore, suppliers may lend more liberally than banks. This simple
argument is at the core of our contract theoretic model of trade credit in competitive
markets. The model implies that trade credit and bank credit can be either com-
plements or substitutes. Among other things, the model explains why trade credit
has short maturity, why trade credit is more prevalent in less developed credit
markets, and why accounts payable of large unrated firms are more countercyclical
than those of small firms. (JEL G32)
A remarkable feature of short-term commer-
cial lending is the central role played by input
suppliers. Suppliers not only sell goods and
services, but extend large amounts of credit as
well. Available evidence on trade credit poses
three broad challenges to economic theory. First
and foremost, why does trade credit exist at all,
with a majority of nonfinancial firms simulta-
neously taking credit from their suppliers and
giving credit to their customers? Second, why
does the magnitude of trade credit vary across
countries, across categories of firms, and over
time?1 Third, why is trade credit less cyclical
than bank credit?2
In the presence of specialized financial inter-
mediaries, it is far from obvious why the ex-
change of goods is bundled with a credit
transaction: When trade credit is cheaper than
bank credit, as is often the case, the puzzle is
that suppliers are willing to lend. When trade
credit is more expensive, the puzzle is that
banks are unwilling to lend. Indeed, a sizable
fraction of firms repeatedly fail to take advan-
tage of early payment discounts and thus end up
borrowing from their suppliers at annual inter-
est rates above 40 percent, having already ex-
hausted their bank credit line (Petersen and
Rajan, 1994, 1997). Why do not banks increase
these firms’ credit lines instead?
A common explanation for trade credit is that
suppliers have a monitoring advantage over
banks. In the course of business, suppliers ob-
tain information about the borrower which other
lenders can only obtain at a cost, as argued by
Robert A. Schwartz and David Whitcomb
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1 In the early 1990’s accounts receivable of listed firms
in the G7 countries varied from 15 to 30 percent of assets on
average. Accounts payable were slightly smaller, typically
about 15 percent of assets on average (Raghuram G. Rajan
and Luigi Zingales, 1995). Trade credit tends to be rather
more important for unlisted firms (Mariassunta Giannetti,
2003), except possibly in the United States (Mitchell A.
Petersen and Rajan, 1997). For a historical account of trade
credit, see Rondo Cameron (1967).
2 See Allan H. Meltzer (1960), Valerie A. Ramey (1992),
Stephen Oliner and Glenn Rudebusch (1996), and Jeffrey H.
Nilsen (2002).
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(1978, 1979), Gary Emery (1987), Xavier
Freixas (1993), Bruno Biais and Christian Gol-
lier (1997), Neelam Jain (2001), and others.
While the monitoring advantage theory is intu-
itively appealing, existing models suffer from
two shortcomings. First, they often fail to ex-
plain why a bank, being specialized in the eval-
uation of borrowers’ creditworthiness, would
frequently have less information than suppliers
do. Second, if we accept that many suppliers
have information that banks do not have, why is
the suppliers’ lending so closely tied to the
value of the input transaction? That is, the the-
ories do not explain why suppliers regularly
lend inputs, but only very rarely lend cash.
In the present paper, we develop a new theory
of trade credit. Like earlier theories it attributes
a monitoring advantage to the supplier, but the
advantage applies exclusively to input transac-
tions. Hence, our theory is immune to the above
criticisms. Specifically, we argue that the source
of the suppliers’ informational advantage is the
input transaction itself. Unlike other lenders, an
input supplier automatically knows that an input
transaction has been completed. Other lenders
can only obtain this information by incurring
monitoring costs. The value of input monitoring
stems in turn from the fundamental difference
between inputs and cash. Cash is easily di-
verted, in particular if diversion is interpreted
broadly as any use of resources which does not
maximize the lenders’ expected return. Most
inputs are less easily diverted, and input illi-
quidity facilitates trade credit.
A salient result of our model is that the avail-
ability of trade credit increases the amount that
banks are willing to lend. For a given bank loan,
additional trade credit permits the borrower
higher levels of diversion as well as investment.
However, due to the relative illiquidity of trade
credit the borrower’s return from investing in-
creases by more than the return from diversion.
Anticipating that available trade credit boosts
investment rather than diversion, banks are will-
ing to increase their lending. Hence, bank credit
and trade credit are complements for firms
whose aggregate debt capacity constrains in-
vestment. By contrast, for firms with sufficient
aggregate debt capacity, trade credit is a substi-
tute for bank credit.
Variation in trade credit across countries and
across time can also be understood within our
model. With perfect legal protection of credi-
tors, trade credit loses its edge, because it be-
comes as difficult to divert cash as to divert
inputs. More generally, the importance of trade
credit compared to bank credit should be greater
when creditor protection is weaker, and when
firms are undercapitalized due to entrepreneurs’
lack of wealth. This may explain the finding by
Asli Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic
(2001) that trade credit is relatively more prev-
alent in countries with worse legal institutions.
As for variation over the business cycle,
Meltzer (1960) famously argued that trade
credit provides a cushion through which
wealthy firms insure poorer firms against the
consequences of tight money. Our model ex-
plains why the cushion is provided by most
suppliers, not just the wealthy ones, and sug-
gests that the cushion against tight money is
most valuable for entrepreneurs with intermedi-
ate amounts of wealth. Very wealthy entrepre-
neurs do not need the cushion, and very poor
entrepreneurs should see their trade credit limits
move in tandem with their bank credit limits.
This is consistent with Nilsen’s (2002) finding
that trade credit is more countercyclical for
large firms (except for firms with a bond rating,
as these firms never need to take costly trade
credit).
Many firms offer trade credit despite having
to take (bank and) trade credit to finance their
operations. We argue that firms simultaneously
give and take trade credit because receivables
can be collateralized. Once an invoice is
pledged as a collateral, it becomes completely
illiquid from the firm’s perspective, and the firm
can obtain additional bank credit against the
receivable. Thus, offering an additional dollar
of trade credit does not force a firm to reduce its
real investment by one dollar. However, since
banks optimally cap their lending against re-
ceivables, there is some crowding out. Accord-
ingly, firms that are credit constrained but
highly profitable abstain from investing in re-
ceivables, leaving the extension of trade credit
to firms that either have better access to funds or
are constrained and relatively unprofitable. Pe-
tersen and Rajan (1997) document that firms in
financial distress increase their supply of trade
credit, a result that they consider surprising. To
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the extent that financial distress goes together
with lower expected returns from investment,
this finding is what our theory would predict.
Note that it is the illiquidity of the collateralized
receivables, not the illiquidity of the inputs, that
matters for the firms’ ability to fund trade credit
extension. Hence, this line of argument would
also be valid in other models of trade credit.
Finally, we demonstrate that trade credit
should have shorter maturity than bank credit.
The reason is that trade credit loses its advan-
tage once illiquid input is transformed into liq-
uid output. Thus, we can explain why bank
credit is routinely rolled over, whereas trade
credit is not.
At the core of our model is the conventional
idea that moral hazard at the investment stage
gives rise to credit rationing of poor entrepre-
neurs. When bank credit is the only source of
funds, our competitive credit market model be-
haves like virtually any other model in the vast
literature on credit rationing. To this generic
model we add a competitive input market and
our two crucial assumptions: Inputs are less
easily diverted than cash is, and input transac-
tions are more easily observed by suppliers
(who take part in them) than by banks.3
As regards earlier theoretical work on trade
credit, the most closely related paper is Biais
and Gollier (1997). Like us, they highlight the
relationship between trade credit and bank fi-
nance. However, we think that their work is best
seen as a general model of multiple lenders.
Biais and Gollier’s key assumption is that the
bank and the supplier have different signals
about the borrower’s creditworthiness; hetero-
geneous signals apart, there is no difference
between bank credit and trade credit.4
Before presenting our model, let us briefly
relate our work to the broader set of trade credit
theories. M. Ishaq Nadiri (1969) is a notable
early contribution to the literature, being first to
formally consider trade credit extension as part
of an optimal selling policy.5 With the advent of
contract theory, authors have identified more
precisely how the extension of trade credit dif-
fers from a decrease in price or an increase in
advertising, and why trade credit is not crowded
out by bank credit. Apart from monitoring ad-
vantage, explanations of trade credit are based
on buyers’ private information about their own
willingness or ability to pay and the sellers’
resulting incentive to price discriminate (Janet
K. Smith, 1987; Michael J. Brennan et al.,
1988); on suppliers’ private information about
product quality (Smith, 1987; Yul W. Lee and
John D. Stowe, 1993; and Michael S. Long et
al., 1993); on suppliers’ advantage in liquidat-
ing collateral (Murray Frank and Maksimovic,
1998); on tax effects (Ivan E. Brick and William
K. H. Fung, 1984), and on long-term buyer/
seller relationships (Benjamin S. Wilner, 2000).
While all these theories have merit, they also
have shortcomings. Price discrimination theo-
ries cannot account for trade credit in competi-
tive markets; the collateral liquidation theory
cannot account for trade credit in service indus-
tries; product quality theories cannot account
for trade credit in homogeneous goods indus-
tries, and the long-term relationship theory can-
not account for trade credit in single business
transactions. Our theory can explain the use of
trade credit in all those instances. At the same
time, it abstracts from potentially important fea-
tures of products and institutions that the other
theories capture. Therefore, our theory comple-
ments the alternative explanations, and empiri-
cal studies will have to decide its quantitative
importance.
I. Model
We consider a risk-neutral entrepreneur who
has observable wealth,   0, and has the
opportunity to invest in a project. To begin with,
we shall assume that the wealth consists entirely
3 The general idea that illiquid assets facilitate borrowing
by limiting the borrower’s discretion has earlier been ex-
plored by Stewart C. Myers and Rajan (1998). They argue
that banks are able to attract depositors precisely because
banks’ loan portfolios are relatively illiquid.
4 A related distinction is that Biais and Gollier focus on
the problem of borrower screening whereas we are con-
cerned with borrower moral hazard. In screening models
there is no obvious distinction between lending cash and
lending inputs.
5 Another early theoretical contribution is J. Stephen
Ferris (1981), who argues that trade credit allows the sup-
plier and the customer to pool liquidity risks. However,
Ferris does not explain why the risk pooling is not handled
by financial intermediaries.
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of cash, but we modify this assumption later.
The entrepreneur’s objective is to maximize his
return to .6
The entrepreneur has access to a project that
transforms an input into an output. (Multiple
inputs would not affect the basic insights.) Let q
denote the amount of purchased input. This
quantity is observable to the input supplier, but
not to outside parties (the bank). We refer to
the input quantity that is put into the project as
the investment, and denote it by I. The project
transforms input into output according to the
production function Q(I) that is deterministic,
increasing, and concave. The investment I is not
verifiable to outsiders. The entrepreneur is a
price taker in both the input and the output
markets; the input price is normalized to 1, and
the output price is denoted by p. The revenues
pQ are assumed to be verifiable. In order to rule
out trivial solutions, we assume that Q(0)  0
(it is impossible to produce any output without
input), and that pQ(0)  1 (neglecting interest
rates, it is always profitable to produce a strictly
positive quantity).
In the absence of wealth constraints, the op-
timal investment is given by the solution to the
first-order condition pQ(I)  1  0. More
generally, in a perfect credit market with an
interest rate rB, the entrepreneur would ideally
want to implement the first-best investment
level, I*(rB), where
(1) pQI*  1  rB .
We assume that the entrepreneur is wealth con-
strained and cannot fund first-best investment
internally, i.e.,   I*(rB). Apart from his
wealth, the entrepreneur has two potential
sources of funding, bank credit and trade credit.
Credit is going to be limited, because the entre-
preneur cannot commit to invest all available
resources into the project. More precisely, the
entrepreneur may use (part of) the available
resources to generate nonverifiable private ben-
efits. Following current practice (e.g., Oliver
Hart, 1995, p. 101–06), we refer to such oppor-
tunistic activities as diversion.
While both output and sales revenues are
verifiable and can therefore be pledged to out-
side investors, neither the input purchase nor the
investment decision are contractible. Thus, the
entrepreneur enjoys project returns only after
honoring all repayment obligations. Diverted
resources, on the other hand, can be enjoyed in
full and are only repaid to the extent that project
returns are available. If all resources are di-
verted, nothing is repaid. The assumption that
diverted resources yield zero return to outside
investors is mainly for simplicity.7
Crucial to the model is that the two sources of
external funding differ in their exposure to
moral hazard. For each unit of cash that the
entrepreneur diverts, he realizes   1 units of
private benefit, while he obtains only  units
of private benefit for each unit of input that he
diverts.8 We interpret  as the level of creditor
vulnerability (creditors are better protected if 
is small), whereas   [0, 1) is a measure of
input liquidity. When  is large, the input can be
transformed into private benefits almost as eas-
ily as cash. If  is small, the input cannot easily
be diverted. An input can be illiquid for several
(related) reasons: It may have a very specific
application (like a service or like special pur-
pose machinery), it may be easy for creditors to
monitor use and resale transactions, or the input
may have a low second-hand value.9
In the absence of diversion opportunities
(  0), legal protection of creditors is perfect,
and it would be possible to fund first-best in-
6 The entrepreneur could also be thought of as a manager
acting in the interest of existing shareholders, who have
provided the equity capital .
7 While looting of companies by insiders is a relevant
problem even in the United States, as documented by
George Akerlof and Paul M. Romer (1993), empire building
and other milder forms of opportunistic behavior are prob-
ably more important.
8 The linearity of the “diversion technology” could be
relaxed with no change in the results. What we need for
some of our results is that diversion is never socially
desirable.
9 In a similar vein, P. V. Viswanath and Mike Frierman
(1995) distinguish asset fungibility, which measures the
scope for manipulating returns from investment (like ),
from asset flexibility, which measures the scope for rede-
ploying the asset (like ). However, Viswanath and Frier-
man are concerned with redeployment of assets by creditors,
following a default, rather than immediate redeployment by
the entrepreneur.
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vestment even for a penniless entrepreneur. In
order to make our problem interesting, we thus
make the assumption that
(2)    
pQI*0  I*0
I*0 .
In words, diversion yields a marginal private
benefit exceeding the average rate of return to
first-best investment at an interest rate of zero.
As already indicated, banks and suppliers are
competitive. We assume that both banks and
suppliers offer credit in the form of overdraft
facilities {(Li, (1  ri)Li)}Li	 L i, where Li is the
loan, (1  ri)Li is the repayment obligation, and
L i is the credit limit.10 Subscripts i  {B, S}
indicate whether the contract is offered by a
bank (B) or by a supplier (S). We interpret the
trade credit interest rate rS as the implicit cost of
eschewing a cash discount.11
Neither banks nor suppliers can condition
their lending on the investment I. The key dif-
ference between banks and suppliers is that
suppliers can more easily condition their lend-
ing on the input purchase q. In order to capture
the difference as simply as possible, we restrict
LB to being a number, whereas we allow LS(q)
to be any real-valued function.
For simplicity, we assume that lending is
exclusive, in the sense that the entrepreneur
may not borrow from multiple banks or multi-
ple suppliers at the same time.
We conclude the description of the model by
specifying the sequence of events.
1. Banks and suppliers simultaneously make
their contract offers.
2. The entrepreneur chooses among the con-
tract offers.
3. The entrepreneur chooses LB, LS, and q.
4. The entrepreneur makes the investment/di-
version decision.
5. The payoff realizes and repayments are
made.
Our framework precludes the possibility that
contracts are conditioned on each other. For
example, the bank cannot condition its load on
the entrepreneur’s choice of trade credit con-
tract. Without this assumption, the bank could
indirectly contract on input purchases. This
would blur the distinction between trade credit
and bank credit. For similar reasons, we assume
that the entrepreneur can visit each lender only
once. If multiple visits were feasible, the entre-
preneur could purchase some inputs before ask-
ing for a further bank loan. The second bank
loan would then depend on the input purchase.
We briefly discuss the effect of multiple visits in
Section III.
II. Pure Bank Finance
In order to highlight the various features of
the model, we first derive the subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the contracting game when trade
credit is unavailable. Showing that the model
generates conventional credit rationing due to
moral hazard in this setting is helpful for eval-
uating the additional results that are generated
once trade credit is introduced.
For simplicity, we assume that banks have
access to unlimited funds at zero marginal cost.
With constant marginal costs, competition
drives banks’ equilibrium profits to zero. None-
theless, banks do not lend unlimited funds, be-
cause a sufficiently large loan tempts the
entrepreneur to divert all the resources—in
which case the bank would make a loss.
Suppose for the moment that the entrepreneur
abstains from diversion. Given a credit limit LB
and an interest rate rB, a nondiverting entrepre-
neur either borrows enough to undertake the
efficient investment I*(rB), or he fully exhausts
the credit limit LB. That is, he utilizes the over-
draft facility up to the point
(3) LBu  min	I*rB, LB
.
10 As shown in Burkart and Ellingsen (2002), overdraft
facilities are optimal contracts in our setting, so this restric-
tion is without loss of generality.
11 If the contract merely specifies 30 days net, we would
thus say that rS  0, neglecting the penalties involved if the
payment is late (late payment is typically considered a
contract violation). Many suppliers offer a discount if the
bill is paid within a certain number of days, n. Our formu-
lation abstracts from the complication arising when n  0.
Whenever a firm faced with such a contract elects to pay
within n days, our model depicts the firm as utilizing bank
credit only. An invoice specifying 30 days net and 2
percent if paid within 10 days has an annualized trade credit
interest rate of 44.6 percent.
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However, the entrepreneur is assumed to be
opportunistic, so investment cannot be taken for
granted. Once the entrepreneur gains access to
the overdraft facility, he chooses I, q, and LB to
maximize utility,
(4) U  max	0, pQI 1 rBLB

 q I  LB q,
subject to the constraints
q 	   LB ,
I 	 q,
LB 	 L B .
The maximand’s first term is the residual return
from investment, taking into account the entre-
preneur’s limited liability. The second term is
the private benefit associated with diversion of
inputs and cash, respectively. The constraints
say that (i) input purchase is constrained by the
available funds, (ii) investment is constrained
by the input purchase, and (iii) bank borrowing
is constrained by the credit limit.
The illiquidity of the input (  1) implies
that the entrepreneur prefers diverting cash to
diverting input. The inefficiency of the diver-
sion technology (  1) and the certain invest-
ment return pQ(I) imply that the entrepreneur
never finds it optimal to divert only a fraction of
the available cash,   LB.12 Thus, diversion is
essentially an all-or-nothing decision. The entre-
preneur behaves prudently if and only if his resid-
ual return from investing exceeds the payoff from
diverting all funds. That is, the credit line LB has to
satisfy the “global incentive constraint”
(5) pQ LBu 1  rB LBu    L B .
(Recall that LBu  LB whenever the credit line
constrains investment, which is the primary
case of interest.) If (5) did not hold, all re-
sources would be diverted, but then the banks
would not lend.13
Since diversion and hence default do not oc-
cur in equilibrium, the equilibrium interest rate
must be rB  0, as this is the only interest rate
that yields zero profit for the banks. It remains
to determine the equilibrium credit limit and
consequent investment.
PROPOSITION 1: For any pair of parameters
(, p) satisfying our assumptions, there exists a
critical wealth level ˆ(, p)  0 such that
entrepreneurs with less wealth than ˆ are credit
constrained and invest strictly less than I*(0).
Entrepreneurs with more wealth than ˆ borrow
less than their credit limit and invest I*(0).
To finance first-best investment, a poor en-
trepreneur with   ˆ would need to borrow
substantially. The resulting large repayment ob-
ligation would leave him with a residual return
below the payoff from diverting all available
funds. Consequently, his credit limit constrains
investment and is given by the binding incen-
tive constraint
(6) pQ  L B   L B    L B .
(Lemma A1 in the Appendix shows that this
constraint is binding for all wealth levels close
enough to zero.) The credit limit cannot be
lower in equilibrium. Otherwise, there would
exist a contract with a higher limit and a higher
interest rate that would be preferred by the bank
as well as the constrained entrepreneur. By con-
trast, wealthy entrepreneurs need to borrow less in
order to fund first-best investment. With a smaller
repayment obligation, the residual return from in-12 The more detailed argument why partial diversion is
dominated goes as follows: Once the entrepreneur plans to
repay the loan in full, the marginal benefit from investment
is at least 1  rB, which is larger than the marginal benefit
from diversion . If, on the other hand, the entrepreneur
were to invest too little to repay the loan in full, there is no
point in investing any resources at all, since any additional
return would be claimed by the bank. Furthermore, if the
entrepreneur diverts borrowed funds, he should also divert
his own funds. Otherwise, these will be claimed by the bank
upon default.
13 As it stands, our model does not explain why diversion
exists. However, it only takes a minor alteration to generate
inefficient diversion in equilibrium. If  is a random vari-
able and its realization is privately known to the entrepre-
neur, the equilibrium (for some distributions of ) has the
feature that the entrepreneur diverts if  is sufficiently high
and invests otherwise.
574 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2004
vestment exceeds the diversion payoff, and hence
the entrepreneur’s investment is unconstrained.14
Finally, we note that there is no other contract
that outperforms the overdraft facility. The
straightforward reason is that a larger invest-
ment would require a larger repayment for the
bank to break even. Since we have already
shown that a larger repayment would violate
the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility con-
straint, the conclusion follows.
III. Bank Finance and Trade Credit
When suppliers can extend credit, a new
trade-off emerges. On the one hand, the use of
trade credit improves the investment incentive be-
cause the supplier lends inputs, which are less
easily diverted than cash. Unlike the bank, the
supplier can also condition the trade credit limit on
the input purchase. On the other hand, the entre-
preneur has more diversion opportunities. As be-
fore, the entrepreneur may divert cash. In addition
(or alternatively), the entrepreneur may now divert
inputs. This option was dominated above, because
all inputs had to be paid in cash. With trade credit,
it becomes possible to cheat the supplier as well.
We will discuss the determination of trade
credit interest rates in Section III, subsection D.
For the moment, let us just assume that the
suppliers’ marginal cost of funds is constant at
some rate 
  0. Since trade credit will ease
the bank credit constraint, we also need to
strengthen our earlier parameter restriction. We
now assume that
(7)    

pQI*
  1  1  
I*

I*
 .
It will be shown below that a penniless entre-
preneur borrows a fraction  of the investment
funds from the bank. Condition (7) thus requires
that a penniless entrepreneur should have a re-
turn to diversion which exceeds the average
return from investment I*(
) [funded with bank
credit LB  I*(
) and trade credit LS  (1 
)I*(
)]. Otherwise, the diversion opportunity
does not constrain investment.
Since competition drives the profits of banks
and suppliers to zero, we know that equilibrium
interest rates are rB  0 and rS  
, respec-
tively. We shall say that the bank credit limit is
binding if I*(rB)  LB   and that the trade
credit limit is binding if I*(rS)  LB  LS(q)  .
Because rS  0, the entrepreneur utilizes
trade credit in equilibrium only if he is suffi-
ciently tightly rationed in the bank credit mar-
ket. More precisely, trade credit is desired at an
interest rate rS if and only if LB    I*(rS).
Suppose that LB is such that this inequality
holds. If the entrepreneur abstains from diver-
sion, he purchases inputs q    LB  LS and
utilizes trade credit
(8) LSu  min	I*rS LB, L Sq
.
That is, a nondiverting entrepreneur takes just
enough trade credit to sustain the efficient in-
vestment level given the marginal cost of funds,
rS. If first-best investment is beyond reach, the
nondiverting entrepreneur invests as much as
the credit lines allow.
As noted above, investment cannot be taken
for granted. The entrepreneur’s problem after
having accepted the contract offers of one bank
and one supplier is to choose q, I, LB, and LS to
maximize his utility
(9) U  max	0, pQI LB 1 rSLS

 q I  LB LS q
subject to the constraints
q 	   LB  LS ,
I 	 q,
LB 	 L B ,
LS 	 L S q.
Compared to the entrepreneur’s optimization
14 In this case, there is an interval of possible credit lines
that yield first-best investment I*(0) and hence the same
utility for the entrepreneur. We abstract from the multiplic-
ity of equilibrium credit lines by focusing on the equilib-
rium in which banks offer the maximum credit line, as given
by, pQ(I*(0))  (I*  )  (  LB).
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problem under pure bank finance (4), the only
real modification is that trade credit, LS, enters
the maximand and the set of constraints in an
analogous fashion to bank credit, LB. Observe
that we do not impose the constraint, LS 	 q, so
suppliers could in principle lend cash. Since the
entrepreneur diverts any spare cash, suppliers
nonetheless only lend inputs in equilibrium.
The introduction of trade credit does not
change the feature that diversion is an all-or-
nothing decision. As above, the entrepreneur
never finds it optimal to divert a fraction of
inputs or cash because of the inefficient diver-
sion technology (  1). Consequently, there
are only two relevant temptations facing the
entrepreneur. First, he may exhaust the avail-
able trade credit only to divert all inputs and any
remaining cash. This temptation is only resisted
(in favor of investing in the project) if
pQL B  LSu    L B  1  rS LSu
 q LB L S q.
The left-hand side of the inequality is the en-
trepreneur’s maximum return from investment;
the right-hand side is the entrepreneur’s return
from borrowing a maximum amount and then
diverting all resources.15
A noteworthy property of this expression is
that any transformation of cash into input re-
duces the value on the right-hand side. Hence,
the maximum incentive-compatible trade credit
limit is increasing in q and reaches its maximum
when all funds are used to buy inputs. We refer
to this maximum trade credit limit as LS, which
is defined as the solution to the equation
(10) pQL B  LSu    L B  1  rS LSu
 LB L S.
The second relevant temptation is not to pur-
chase any inputs at all (in which case the sup-
plier does not offer any trade credit, so LS  0)
and to divert the cash   LB. The entrepreneur
abstains from diverting all cash only if
(11) pQL B  LSu    L B  1  rS LSu
 LB.
Hence, the equilibrium credit limits are deter-
mined by the incentive constraints (10) and
(11).
As we have already seen, sufficiently wealthy
entrepreneurs do not utilize trade credit. As
wealth decreases, some trade credit is used, and
the investment level is determined by the first-
order condition
pQI  1  rS   0.
Eventually, for the poorest entrepreneurs, both
bank credit and trade credit limits are fully
exhausted.
PROPOSITION 2: For given parameters (,
, p) there exist critical wealth levels ˜1  0
and ˜2  ˜1 such that: (i) entrepreneurs with
wealth above ˜2 take no trade credit and invest
I  [I*(rS), I*(0)]; (ii) entrepreneurs with
wealth in-between ˜1 and ˜2 take trade credit
and invest I*(rS); (iii) entrepreneurs with wealth
below ˜1 exhaust both bank and trade credit
limits and invest less than I*(rS).
The investment of entrepreneurs with wealth
above ˜2 is unaffected by the availability of
trade credit, because they can already invest
I*(rS) or more. However, all entrepreneurs with
less wealth than ˜2 would have invested less
than I*(rS) if trade credit were unavailable.
Compared to the pure bank lending regime, the
introduction of trade credit therefore increases
efficiency. (For a complete proof of Proposition
2, see the Appendix.)
Because our assumed sequence of moves al-
lows the entrepreneur to visit the supplier only
once, banks play an unrealistically passive role.
Consider for instance the modified setting
where the entrepreneur can visit the supplier
twice—before and after contracting with a
bank—and where banks can inspect the entre-
preneur’s balance sheet. In this setting, banks
would lend more. Indeed, if the entrepreneur
15 Since revenues are verifiable, the bank can claim
project returns even if all the bank’s money has been di-
verted. Thus, diverting all resources dominates diverting
some (or all) of the bank loan and investing some (or all)
trade credit.
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first purchases inputs with all his wealth  and
this is observed by the banks, the constraint that
the entrepreneur should not divert cash is given
by
pQL B  LSu    L B  1  rS LSu
 LB .
Compared to equation (11), the right-hand side
is reduced by (1  ), which translates into
a higher bank credit line LB. In the extreme case
that the entrepreneur could costlessly move
back and forth between the supplier and the
bank arbitrarily many times, and balance
sheet monitoring as well as other transaction
costs were zero, trade credit would vanish.
Except in this extreme case, more active bank
monitoring would, however, not eliminate
trade credit.
A. Properties of the Credit Limits
Having shown that trade credit eases credit
rationing, we now describe how the two
credit limits, LB and LS [given by equations (10)
and (11)], are affected by parameter changes.
PROPOSITION 3: (i) For an entrepreneur with
wealth smaller than ˜1 the equilibrium credit
lines LB and LS are increasing in the output
price (p) and in the entrepreneur’s wealth ()
and are decreasing in the creditor vulnerability
(), in the input liquidity (), and in the trade
credit interest rate (rS). (ii) For   [˜1, ˜2),
the same results hold, except that LB is inde-
pendent of .
PROOF:
See the Appendix.
When we consider the aggregate credit limit
LB  LS, these results are quite intuitive. A
higher output price increases the profitability of
investment relative to diversion, and must there-
fore increase the aggregate credit limit. Like-
wise, an increase in wealth increases the
entrepreneur’s residual return to investment for
a given loan size, making larger repayment in-
centive compatible. As a result, the aggregate
credit limit must increase. On the other hand, an
increase in creditor vulnerability or input liquid-
ity increases the profitability of diversion rela-
tive to investment, and therefore decreases the
aggregate credit limit.
The more surprising feature of Proposition 3
is that bank credit and trade credit always move
in the same direction. For example, a decrease
in  entails an increase in both LB and LS.
Why does lower input liquidity not simply en-
tail substitution from bank credit to trade credit?
The complementarity between the bank credit
limit and the trade credit limit arises because
more trade credit always makes investment of a
given bank loan more valuable compared to
diversion of the loan. [Technically, the left-
hand side of (11) is increasing in LSu.] In other
words, any entrepreneur who is rationed in the
bank credit market is offered more bank credit
when trade credit becomes available.
We would like to stress that input illiquidity
increases the aggregate credit limit partly be-
cause inputs are worthless as collateral in our
model. Whenever there is bankruptcy, there are
no assets left for the creditors to seize. In mod-
els where creditors can seize assets when the
entrepreneur defaults, but diversion by the bor-
rower is ruled out, asset illiquidity instead tends
to reduce the borrower’s debt capacity (Myers,
1977; Hart, 1995, Ch. 6). Thus, in a more gen-
eral model with exogenous payoff uncertainty
and collateral, the relationship between asset
liquidity and aggregate debt capacity is ambig-
uous. From a funding perspective, the ideal
asset is difficult for the entrepreneur to divert
and at the same time has a high collateral value.
Proposition 3 is only concerned with the
amount of trade credit available to the entrepre-
neur. When this amount is not a binding con-
straint, the entrepreneur exhausts the bank
credit limit and uses trade credit to the extent
that the marginal return from investment pQ(I)
equals the marginal cost (1  rS).
PROPOSITION 4: For entrepreneurs with wealth
  (˜1, ˜2) trade credit utilization LS is de-
creasing in the entrepreneur’s wealth () and
increasing in creditor vulnerability (). An in-
crease in the output price (p) or in the trade
credit interest rate (rS) have an indeterminate
effect on LS.
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PROOF:
See the Appendix.
These entrepreneurs exhaust the bank credit
limit and invest I*(rS), which is independent
of both wealth and creditor vulnerability. Fol-
lowing a change in either  or , the entre-
preneurs continue to invest I*(rS) and
compensate the reduction (increase) in L B
fully by an increase (reduction) in LS. In other
words, there is only a credit substitution effect.
This reasoning does not apply to variations in
the output price or in the trade credit interest
rate, because these parameters also affect I*(rS).
Therefore there is a credit volume effect as well.
For example, an increase in rS leads to a de-
crease in I*(rS) as well as in LB. The overall
effect on trade credit utilization depends on
which reduction is larger. Notably, trade credit
can be a “Giffen good,” in the sense that trade
credit demand is, over some range, an increas-
ing function of rS. The Giffen phenomenon only
requires that I* is relatively insensitive to rS, in
which case the credit substitution effect domi-
nates the credit volume effect.
B. Credit Over the Business Cycle
Our theory predicts a sharp difference in
trade credit dynamics depending on whether the
borrower is rationed in the trade credit market
or not. For those entrepreneurs that are con-
strained, bank credit volumes and trade credit
volumes move in the same direction. For those
who are not constrained by their trade credit
limits, bank credit and trade credit should typ-
ically move in opposite directions. If we inter-
pret a business cycle as a fluctuation in
entrepreneurs’ net worth, our model yields the
following predictions.
PROPOSITION 5: For any entrepreneur whose
bank credit limit binds: (i) Bank credit is procy-
clical. (ii) Trade credit is procyclical for entrepre-
neurs who exhaust their trade credit limit and
countercyclical for those that do not.
When there is a general credit crunch due to
a drop in corporate wealth, all firms face tighter
bank credit limits. Constrained firms also have
to reduce their use of trade credit in tandem with
the tighter bank credit limits. Firms that are
unconstrained in the trade credit market instead
increase their trade credit borrowing.
Proposition 5 sheds light on the recent find-
ing by Nilsen (2002), that large U.S. firms with-
out a bond rating increase their use of trade
credit during monetary contractions more than
unrated small firms do. This finding has been
considered puzzling because large firms are
considered to be financially sounder and hence
supposedly less dependent on trade credit than
small firms are. We think that this is indeed true.
The crux is that those (often small) firms that
are most dependent on trade credit cannot in-
crease their trade credit borrowing in recessions
because they already exhaust their trade credit
limit. To put it bluntly: The only thing worse
than having to increase trade credit borrowing is
to be unable to do so. Conventional wisdom
therefore holds only for the comparison be-
tween rated versus unrated firms. Firms with a
bond rating do not need to utilize costly trade
credit even in a recession, so their trade credit
volumes should be cyclical, tracking the change
in input purchases.
If unconstrained firms dominate among those
that take trade credit, our model produces coun-
tercyclical swings in trade credit, as has been
observed in U.S. data by Ramey (1992).16 In
less developed economies, it is likely that con-
strained firms dominate, in which case trade
credit should be procyclical with respect to
wealth shocks.17
C. Cross-Sectional Predictions
While input illiquidity provides the rationale
for trade credit, we have not yet shown that a
higher degree of input liquidity, , leads to a
smaller amount of trade credit. When the entre-
preneur is credit rationed, the hypothesis is true.
16 Ramey’s finding is sensitive to data set and method.
For example, Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) do not find a
countercyclical movement in trade credit.
17 When the cycle is caused by swings in demand (p)
rather than changes in entrepreneurs’ wealth, the model’s
predictions are more ambiguous, because unconstrained
firms may use either more or less trade credit as demand
changes.
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PROPOSITION 6: For entrepreneurs who ex-
haust their trade credit limit, trade credit as a
fraction of investment is decreasing in input
liquidity, .
The proof is easy. Divide equation (10) by
(11) to get
LS    LB 1  /.
It follows immediately that the ratio of trade
credit to investment is
(12) LS
  LB  LS
 1  .
The intuition is also straightforward. Higher
input liquidity reduces both credit limits, but
does not affect the entrepreneur’s wealth. The
result, that poor users of liquid inputs utilize
relatively less trade credit than do poor users of
illiquid inputs, is a unique prediction of our
model.18
A limitation of Proposition 6 is that it applies
only to firms that exhaust their trade credit limit.
This result is quite difficult to test unless one
has good empirical measures of credit con-
straints. As it turns out, other results hold re-
gardless of whether firms exhaust their trade
credit limit. The model gives clear predictions
both with respect to entrepreneurs’ wealth and
with respect to creditor protection.
PROPOSITION 7: The ratio of trade credit to
investment is nonincreasing in wealth () and
nondecreasing in creditor vulnerability ().
For firms that are constrained in both mar-
kets, we know from (12) that the ratio LS /I
depends only on . For firms that are only
constrained in the bank credit market, bank and
trade credit are substitutes with respect to
changes in  and  (Proposition 4). Hence, the
ratio of trade credit to investment is decreasing
in  and increasing in . Proposition 7 is
broadly confirmed by the balance sheet data of
Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Giannetti
(2003), which indicate that trade credit is more
important in countries with worse creditor pro-
tection.19 In Giannetti’s sample of (predomi-
nantly) unlisted firms in eight European
countries, accounts payable constitute on aver-
age 29 percent in Italy, 30 percent in France,
and 36 percent in Portugal, while being only 11
percent in Netherlands and 15 percent in the
United Kingdom. More systematic evidence is
offered in the recent study by Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
and Maksimovic (2001) covering large manu-
facturing firms in 40 countries. As predicted by
our model, they find that trade credit as a frac-
tion of sales is significantly negatively related to
law and order.
D. Extending Trade Credit
Until now, we have considered an entrepre-
neur who starts up a new venture, endowed with
cash only. This framework suffices for studying
accounts payable, but cannot capture accounts
receivable. In order to have a role for accounts
receivable, we need to consider an entrepreneur
with a going concern.
Suppose for simplicity that a stock of output
with market value  is the sole asset being left
over from last period, once all outstanding debts
have been repaid. As should be clear from the
derivation of (10) and (11), it is generally not
desirable to sell all the output on credit: If the
customer faces a binding bank credit limit of the
form (11), an input purchase q  0 financed
exclusively with trade credit will induce the
customer to divert and default, as the right-hand
side of (11) increases by q. Denote by  the
highest fraction of output sold on trade credit
that keeps the customer from diverting. When
selling a fraction  on credit at an interest rate s,
18 For entrepreneurs who do not exhaust their trade credit
limit, the bank credit limit is independent of , as shown in
Proposition 3. It follows that trade credit utilization is in-
dependent of  as well.
19 Recent empirical work by Raymond Fisman and In-
essa Love (2003) indicates that the difference in firms’
performance across countries is smaller in industries that
rely heavily on trade credit, as measured by trade credit use
in the United States. A possible interpretation of their find-
ing is that U.S. firms’ funding advantage on average is
smaller in these industries than in other industries; i.e., US
is relatively high and US is relatively low. Alternatively,
these industries rely on sufficiently illiquid input every-
where, and so do not face binding credit constraints.
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the entrepreneur obtains a cash balance of
(1  ) and trade credit claims with a face
value of (1  s). Would the entrepreneur be
willing to do this, considering the need for
investment funds? Clearly, the answer depends
on whether it is possible to borrow against the
trade credit claims or not. Suppose transaction
costs are zero, and that the trade credit claim is
safe and verifiable. Then the entrepreneur can
go to a bank and borrow (1  s) against it. If
s  0, it is optimal to extend trade credit,
because this financial investment does not in-
terfere with the real investment. On the con-
trary, the extension of trade credit leaves the
entrepreneur with liquid wealth of (1  s).
He can thus fund a larger project than before.20
The frictionless case is a useful benchmark,
but it is a poor description of reality. Banks are
rarely willing to lend fully against the face value
of trade credit claims; as a rule of thumb, banks
offer to lend only 80 percent (and sometimes
less) of accounts receivable (Shezad L. Mian
and Clifford W. Smith, 1992). Within our
model, the lending cap can be explained as a
response to the problem of reckless trade credit
extension. If firms could lend fully against re-
ceivables, they would be tempted to lift their
customers’ trade credit limit beyond the incen-
tive compatible level . The entrepreneur may
lend recklessly to customers, with the objective
himself to divert all resources after having bor-
rowed against the receivables.21
Capping Receivable Secured Lending.—To
avoid reckless lending by suppliers, banks need
to cap their lending against receivables. Sup-
pose for a moment that customers cannot use
side-payments to bribe suppliers into reckless
extension of trade credit. By capping lending
against receivables at a fraction below 1/(1 
s), the bank completely eliminates recklessness.
Due to the cap, an entrepreneur who plans to
divert resources prefers selling all the inputs for
cash to lending recklessly. (Since project reve-
nues are verifiable, it does not make sense to
lend recklessly and invest proceeds in the
project.) If side-payments from customers to
suppliers are feasible, receivable secured lend-
ing may have to be capped at a level  well
below 1/(1  s). However, even with a tight cap
on receivable secured lending, it can be quite
attractive to offer trade credit. For an entrepre-
neur who is rationed by banks and suppliers, it
is optimal to offer trade credit as long as a dollar
of trade credit yields as high a return as a dollar
of real investment. Since a one-dollar receivable
translates into 1  s dollars at the end of the
period, and yields an immediate additional bank
loan of  dollars, to be invested in the project
and repaid at the end of the period, extending
trade credit is profitable if
1  s  pQI  1  pQI.
PROPOSITION 8: On the margin, the entre-
preneur is willing to extend trade credit if and
only if s  (1  )(pQ(I)  1).
Note that if   0.8 the interest rate on trade
bills s only needs to exceed 20 percent of the
return to real investment in order for the entre-
preneur to be willing to offer trade credit.22 By
the same token, an entrepreneur who takes trade
credit at an interest rate rS, but who is not
rationed by suppliers, is willing to offer trade
credit if and only if s  (1  )rS. With  
0.8, the marginal trade credit cost therefore has
to be five times the marginal trade credit reve-
nue before the entrepreneur stops giving trade
credit.
The fundamental reason why firms are will-
ing to extend trade credit at a lower rate than
they themselves pay is that an extra dollar in-
vested in receivables is not funded by an extra
dollar of payables, because receivables create
additional bank funding. Any model in which
receivables can be used as collateral has this
feature, not just ours. However, it is worth
20 In equilibrium, the interest rate s should be competed
down to zero. More on this below.
21 The argument presumes that banks cannot observe
directly whether a trade bill is likely to be paid back or not.
We think that this assumption is natural, because the sup-
plier’s bank often has no credit relation with the customer.
22 Of course, the entrepreneur may alternatively sell
trade bills to a factoring company. In our stylized model
there is little difference between receivable secured lending
and factoring with recourse; we refer to Mian and Smith
(1992) and Ben J. Sopranzetti (1998) for further discussions
of the costs and benefits of factoring.
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pointing out that receivables have the capacity
to support additional bank credit precisely be-
cause an invoice can easily be made illiquid.
When lending against an invoice, the bank ob-
tains the right to the money that the customer
owes the entrepreneur, and the bank will collect
the customer’s payment in case the entrepreneur
defaults on the bank loan. Thus, from the en-
trepreneur’s perspective the invoice is com-
pletely illiquid once it is offered as collateral.
Trade Credit Interest Rates.—Can the model
explain observed trade credit interest rates? In a
competitive market, equilibrium trade credit in-
terest rates are not driven by the financial status
of a single supplier. The trade credit interest rate
increases above the bank rate only if the sup-
pliers are collectively credit rationed. This is our
explanation for why trade credit terms are so
similar within industries, and so heterogeneous
across industries and countries (Chee K. Ng et
al., 1999; Guiseppe Marotta, 2001). If firms in a
competitive industry differ widely in the degree
to which they are credit constrained, we would
expect to see some (constrained) firms avoiding
to give trade credit and others being very will-
ing to offer it, but not to see firms offering trade
credit at different interest rates.
With perfect competition among suppliers,
our model implies quite low trade credit interest
rates in equilibrium. As an extreme example,
suppose that all industries use inputs from at
least one other industry and that the marginal
firm offering trade credit in each industry is
itself unconstrained by its trade creditors. In this
economy, the only candidate for an equilibrium
trade credit interest rate is the bank rate: Firms
that borrow at positive trade credit interest rates
would offer trade credit at a lower rate (a
smaller premium on the bank rate) than they
take it. Since all industries cannot have lower
interest rates than their suppliers in other indus-
tries, the trade credit interest rate in all indus-
tries must equal the bank rate. But even in an
industry consisting entirely of heavily credit-
constrained suppliers, who all have a marginal
rate of return on investment (pQ(I)  1)  0,
our model predicts a trade credit interest rate
equal to (pQ(I)  1)(1  ), i.e., only about a
fifth of the marginal return to investment for
typical values of the lending cap .
We contend that the small equilibrium differ-
ential between the bank interest rate and the
trade credit interest rate could explain the wide-
spread use of net terms. Instead of offering trade
credit at the bank rate, or a rate so close to the
bank rate that few buyers bother to pay before
the bill is due, suppliers might as well offer net
terms only, i.e., include the (bank) interest rate
in the price to be paid in, say, 30 days.23 On the
other hand, as mentioned in the introduction,
there are quite a few industries with very high
trade credit interest rates, frequently in the form
of big discounts for early payment. It seems to
us that real trade credit interest rates of 40
percent per year must, with few exceptions, be
due to lack of competition among suppliers.24
E. Loan Maturity
In reality, trade credit has much shorter ma-
turity than bank credit. Overdraft facilities are
typically renewed once a year, and renewal is
regularly granted if the borrower has been able
not to draw on the overdraft facility for at least
30 days during the preceding year. Trade credit,
on the other hand, generally matures in 30 or 60
days.
To explore the different maturity of bank and
trade credit, we consider a sequence of two
periods, each period corresponding to the model
analyzed in subsections A–C of this section. In
each period the entrepreneur borrows from a
bank and a supplier, purchases input, and makes
an investment decision. The entrepreneur re-
pays at the end of periods 1 or 2 depending on
maturity. For simplicity, we assume that bank
and trade credit limits bind in both periods and
abstract from the possibility that the entrepre-
neur extends trade credit himself.
23 Net terms, in their turn, explain why many firms rely
so little on short-term bank credit, using it primarily for
funding inputs for which trade credit is unavailable or too
short. (As pointed out by a referee, another explanation for
net terms is that sellers want to induce buyers to purchase
early, in order to save inventory costs.)
24 One such exception is if the traded good invites ex
post haggling over quality. Prevention of renegotiation
might be a reason why large cash discounts are offered to
retailers of fashionable clothes.
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PROPOSITION 9: (i) The equilibrium matu-
rity of bank credit is indeterminate. (ii) Trade
credit has short maturity in equilibrium.
The proof has three steps. Suppose first that
bank and trade credit both have short maturity,
implying that loans taken at the beginning of
period 1 are repaid at the end of period 1. After
repaying first-period debts, the entrepreneur en-
ters period 2 in a similar situation as in the
beginning of period 1. However, since the en-
trepreneur makes a profit in the first period
(otherwise he would have diverted all re-
sources), his wealth is higher. That is, 2  1.
Since the credit limits are increasing functions
of wealth, we know that LB2  LB1 and LS2(q) 
LS1(q).
Let us next consider a long-term bank loan.
The entrepreneur could borrow LB1 from the
bank at the beginning of period 1, but ask that
the bank loan does not mature before the end of
period 2. Given that the credit limit can be
increased from LB1 to LB2 at the beginning of
period 2, the entrepreneur’s incentives are ex-
actly the same as under the short-term bank
contract. The only difference is that the entre-
preneur keeps LB1 at the end of period 1 and thus
only receives the smaller additional loan LB2 
LB1 at the beginning of period 2. In other words,
the maturity of the bank loan is irrelevant for
investment incentives. Thus, equilibrium matu-
rity is indeterminate, proving part (i) of Propo-
sition 9.
By contrast, the maturity of trade credit does
affect the entrepreneur’s borrowing constraint.
Suppose that the first period’s trade credit LS1
matures at the end of period 2, and that addi-
tional trade credit can be taken at the beginning
of period 2. First-period bank liabilities apart,
the entrepreneur has liquid resources 2  LS1
(in cash or output) when visiting the bank at the
beginning of period 2. In analogy with (11), the
constraint that the entrepreneur should not di-
vert all the cash in period 2 becomes
pQL B2  L S2  2  L B2  1  rS L S2
 2 LB2  L S1.
If trade credit has short maturity, so LS1 is
repaid at the end of period 1, the entrepreneur
has only his wealth 2 when coming to the
bank at the beginning of period 2. (Again we
abstract from any outstanding period 1 bank
debt.) Accordingly, the incentive constraint is
pQL B2  L S2  2  L B2  1  rS L S2
 2 LB2.
Since the entrepreneur has less cash when
visiting the bank in the latter case, the right-
hand side is now smaller, reflecting a smaller
temptation to divert cash. As a result, the
sustainable level of bank credit L B2 is larger.
Long-term trade credit contracts cannot ap-
pear in equilibrium, because a supplier could
then make a profit by offering a short-term
contract.
Intuitively, trade credit ceases to be useful in
constraining diversion once illiquid input is
transformed into liquid output. Therefore, sales
revenues should be used to repay input suppliers
as fast as possible, with new trade credit being
granted only in connection with new input
purchases.
IV. Final Remarks
Suppliers lend goods and banks lend cash.
This simple observation has been shown to pro-
vide a coherent explanation for the existence of
trade credit, even in competitive credit and
product markets. Confronting the theory with
broadbrush evidence from previous studies, we
think it stands up well. In future work we hope
to investigate empirically the additional predic-
tions that the theory generates.
The theory itself might also be extended in
several directions by admitting, for example, a
richer temporal structure, uncertainty, multi-
input technologies, collateral, and imperfect
competition.
Finally, trade credit is not the sole instance of
in-kind finance. Leasing contracts and postpay-
ment of wages and salaries are two other exam-
ples. Future work will show whether the
commitment value of illiquid assets is helpful in
explaining such contractual arrangements.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Proposition 1 is proved in the main text, with the exception of the existence and uniqueness of
ˆ(, p).
LEMMA A1: There exists a unique threshold   ˆ(, p)  0 such that LB    I*(0) and
pQ(LB  )  (1  )LB    0.
PROOF:
Recall that the credit line LB is given by the binding incentive constraint (6),
(A1) pQL B    L B  L B    0.
Observe that the constraint is only binding if pQ(LB  )  (1  )  0. (Otherwise LB could
be increased without violating the incentive constraint.) In order to show that there is a unique value
of  such that   LB()  I*(0), it suffices to show (i) that 0  LB(0)  I*(0) and (ii) that LB is
(continuously) increasing in . Part (i) follows immediately from our assumption that   
[equation (2)]. Part (ii) is established by differentiating the incentive constraint, to get
pQI  1   dL B  pQI   d  0,
or equivalently,
dL B
d  
pQI
pQI 1 .
The numerator is positive, because pQ(I)  1 by the first-order condition, and   1. As shown
above, the denominator is negative whenever the incentive constraint binds.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
Proposition 2 is proved in the main text, except for the existence and uniqueness of ˜1(, , p)
and ˜2(, , p). Also we need to show that ˜2(, , p)  ˜1(, , p). To prove these properties (and
subsequent comparative-static results), it is helpful to define the function
hI  pQI  1  rS    rS .
The following result is used repeatedly.
LEMMA A2: For all I  I*(rS), h(I)  0.
PROOF:
When both credit limits bind, (10) and (11) become
(A2) pQL B  L S    L B  1  rS L S  L B  L S  
and
(A3) pQL B  L S    L B  1  rS L S  L B  .
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It follows that
L S 
1  

L B  .
Thus, LB  LS   I  (LB  )/. Substituting into (A3) and rearranging, we have the following
expression for the maximum incentive compatible investment level:
(A4) pQI  1  rS 1    1  I    0.
By virtue of being maximal, the expression must have a negative derivative, i.e.,
pQI  1  rS 1    1    0.
Slight rearrangement yields the desired result.
We now complete the proof of Proposition 2 by establishing the existence and uniqueness of
˜1(, , p) and of ˜2(, , p) and ˜2(, , p)  ˜1(, , p).
LEMMA A3: For any   rS there exists a pair of threshold values ˜1(, , p), ˜2(, , p) such
that
(i) pQ(LB  )  LB  [LB  ]  0 for   ˜2(, , p),
(ii) pQ(LB  LS  )  LB  (1  rS)LS  [LB  ]  0 and pQ(LB  LS  )  LB 
(1  rS)LS  [LB  LS  ]  0 for   ˜1(, , p),
(iii) ˜2(, , p)  ˜1(, , p)  0.
PROOF:
Part (i): The threshold ˜2(, , p) is the smallest wealth such that the entrepreneur can fund I*(rS)
using bank credit alone. The proof of existence and uniqueness of this threshold is analogous to the
proof of Lemma A1 and hence omitted.
Part (ii): The threshold level ˜1(, , p) is the smallest wealth that admits investing I  I*(rS)
using both bank and trade credit. Since (A4) gives the maximum investment level for a given level
of wealth, the threshold level of wealth must satisfy
(A5) ˜1 , , p  1    1  1  rS I*rS   pQI*rS .
The threshold exists and is unique if both LB and LS are increasing in . Totally differentiating (A2)
and (A3) and solving yields
dL B
d  
pQI 1 1 rS 
hI  0
and
dL S
d  
1 
hI  0,
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where the inequalities follow directly from Lemma A2. Thus, both credit limits are increasing in .
Part (iii): It follows from   rS that [(1  )  (1  )(1  rS)]  (1  ) and hence
˜2(, , p)  ˜1(, , p). Finally, ˜1(, , p)  0 follows from the assumption that    ().
The threshold levels have the following properties.
LEMMA A4: The critical threshold ˜1(, , p) increases with the ease of diversion () and the
input liquidity (), while a change in either the output prices (p) or in the interest rate (rS) has an
indeterminate effect on ˜1(, , p).
PROOF:
Differentiation of (A5) yields
d˜1 , , p
d  I*rS   0,
d˜1 ,,p
d    rS I*rS   0,
d˜1 ,,p
drS
 1    1  1  rS   pQI
dI*rS 
drS
 1  I*rS ,
and
d˜1 , , p
dp  1    1  1  rS   pQI
dI*
dp  QI*rS .
From Lemma A2 we know that [(1  )  (1  )(1  rS)  pQ(I)]  0 and hence that the first
term of d˜/drS is negative. As the second term is positive, the overall sign is indeterminate.
Similarly, the sign of d˜/dp is indeterminate.
LEMMA A5: The threshold ˜2(, , p) increases with the ease of diversion () and decreases with
the interest rate (rS), while a change in the output prices (p) has an indeterminate effect on
˜2(, , p).
PROOF:
The threshold ˜2 is given by
pQI*rS   1  I*rS   ˜2 , , p  0,
and since the investment is maximal, we have that pQ(I*(rS))  (1  )  0. Differentiation yields
d˜2 , , p
d  I*rS   0,
d˜2 ,,p
drS
 1    pQI
dI*rS 
drS
 0,
and
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d˜2 , , p
dp  1    pQI
dI*
dp  QI*rS .
As for d˜2/dp, the sign is indeterminate, because the first term is positive and the second term is
negative.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
PROPOSITION 3: (i) For an entrepreneur with wealth smaller than ˜1 the equilibrium credit lines
LB and LS are increasing in the output price (p) and in the entrepreneur’s wealth () and are
decreasing in the creditor vulnerability (), in the input liquidity (), and in the trade credit interest
rate (rS). (ii) For   [˜1, ˜2), the same results hold, except that LB is independent of .
PROOF:
We start by proving part (i). For entrepreneurs with   ˜1(, , p) the bank and trade credit
limits are given by (A2) and (A3). Differentiating these two equations with respect to LB, LS, and p
yields (after some manipulation)
dL B
dp 
QI
hI
and
dL S
dp 
1 QI
hI ,
which are both positive (the denominators are negative by Lemma A2).
The proof that dLB/d  0 and that dLS/d  0 is already provided in Lemma A3.
Differentiating (A2) and (A3) with respect to LB, LS, and  yields
dL B
d 
L B  
hI
and
dL S
d 
L B  1  
hI ,
which are both negative by Lemma A2.
Differentiating (A2) and (A3) with respect to LB, LS, and  yields
dL S
d  
LB L SpQI 1
hI
and
dL B
d 
L B  L S  pQI  1  rS 
hI .
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By Lemma A2, the denominator h(I) is negative, and so is the numerator of dLS /d. The numerator
of dLB /d is positive, because pQ(I)  1  rS at I  I*.
Differentiating (A2) and (A3) with respect to LB, LS, and rS yields
dL B
drS

L S
hI
and
dL S
drS

1  L S
hI ,
which are both negative by Lemma A2.
Part (ii) of Proposition 3 is proved in similar fashion. For entrepreneurs with   [1(, , p),
ˆ2(, , p)) bank and trade credits are given by
pQL B  LS    L B  1  rS LS  L B    0
and
pQL B  LS    1  rS   0.
The comparative static results are established by totally differentiating these two equations. We omit
the details, except noting that  no longer appears in any of the expressions.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
PROPOSITION 4: For entrepreneurs with wealth   (˜1, ˜2) trade credit utilization LS is
decreasing in the entrepreneur’s wealth () and increasing in creditor vulnerability . The effects
on LS of an increase in the output price (p) or in the trade credit interest rate (rS) are indeterminate.
For changes in  and  we prove an even more precise result.
LEMMA A6: Following an increase in the ease of diversion () entrepreneurs with   (˜1, ˜2)fully substitute the reduction in bank credit (supply) with trade credit, i.e.,
dL B
d  
dLS
d  .
PROOF:
For entrepreneurs with  (˜1 , ˜2) bank and trade credit demand are independent of  and given
by
(A6) pQL B  LS    L B  1  rS LS  L B    0
and
(A7) pQL B  LS    1  rS   0.
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Differentiating (A6) and (A7) with respect to LB, LS, and  yields
pQI  1   dL B  pQI  1  rS  dLS  L B   d  0
and
pQI dL B  pQI dLS  0.
Solving yields
dL B
d  
LB
 rS
 0.
LEMMA A7: Following an increase in wealth, entrepreneurs with   (˜1, ˜2) fully substitute
trade credit with bank credit.
PROOF:
Differentiating (A6) and (A7) with respect to LB, LS, and  yields
dL B
d  
pQI 1 rS
pQI 1
dLS
d 
pQI
pQI 1
and
dLS
d  1 dLBd.
Solving yields
dL B
d 
1
  rS 
 1  0,
and
dLS
d  
1
 rS
 0.
Finally, we show that the effect of changes in p and rS are indeterminate.
LEMMA A8: Following an increase in the trade credit interest rate rS, entrepreneurs with  
(˜1, ˜2) may demand more or less trade credit.
PROOF:
Differentiating (A6) and (A7) with respect to LB, LS, and rS (and solving) yields
dL B
drS

pQI  1  rS /pQI  LS
  rS 
 0
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and
dLS
drS

LS
  rS 

pQI  1  
pQI  rS   0.
LEMMA A9: Following an increase in the output price (p), entrepreneurs with   (˜1, ˜2) may
demand more or less trade credit.
PROOF:
Totally differentiating bank and trade credit demands with respect to LB, LS, and p (and solving)
yields
dL B
dp 
QI
  rS 

pQI  1  rS 
  rS 
QI
pQI  0
and
dLS
dp  
QI
 rS

pQI 1
 rS
QI
pQI 0.
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